British India And Tibet Dr. Reena Nand

 British India And Tibet

Dr. Reena Nand*

N o other land frontier in the world is as strong as the great great Himalayas where lies the earstwhile mountain kingdom Tibet. From time immemorial, Tibet has been a significant factor in the political development of India, for it is a key to the safety and security of India's north-eastern frontier. Situated well inside the mountain ramparts, this Himalayan state provides a safety valve against invasion from Central Asia. This is why Tibet has always excited the curiosity and attention of the rulers of India whether they were Britishers or Indians. When the British consolidated their power in this sub-continent, they also realised the importance of securing a stable frontier on India's Himalayan borders. The British, therefore, had to evolve a definite policy towards Himalayan kingdoms lying on India's north-eastern corner especially Tibet as a buffer state.

This safety valve on India's Himalayan borders does not, however, exist now because of Chinese occupation of Tibet which forced the Dalai Lama to flee away from the land of his birth and faith. All these happened after the Britishers left India in 1947 and we became the masters of our destiny. This naturally suggests that while British India had a sound and successful Tibetan policy, our approach was somewhat defective as an independent nation. This article attempts to study and interpret British relations with Tibet during the period from the days of the East India Company to the British India till 1905.

British India's relation with Tibet began during the days of East India Company when they focused to open the 'Forbidden Land' of the Lamas to British Trade. As early as March, 1768, the Court of Directors in London had instructed their Agents in India to assess the prospects of British trade in Tibet. Unlike the earlier British pursuance of purely commercial interests, we notice a shift in their approach in the eighties of the 19th century when they did cultivate some political motives too. For example, Warren Hastings, sent two missions to Tibet in later part of 18th century, while the sole motive to open a mutual and equal communication of trade between India and Tibet. Even with change of administration in 1858 from

the Company to the Crown, the dominant note of British rule in this country was still economic exploitation and commercial gain. But, three decades later when Colman Macaulay was sent as head of a Mission to Tibet, the British hoped to achieve definite political influence in Central Asia by gaining access to the Holy city of the Dalai Lama who were revered and respected throughout the Buddhist world. This is evident from the pages of his Memorandum submitted to Randolph Churchill, the then Secretary of State for India, wherein Macaulay had confided: "Our political influence in Central Asia would receive an enormous accession if, all misunderstanding and jealousy being removed, a British envoy and the Chinese Imperial Commissioner were to meet at the court of the Dalai Lama on cordial terms as the representatives of the great Empires of Asia in alliance",

But once the British Government had consolidated their power in India, they were increasingly faced with the problem of safeguarding the long land frontier of this sub-continent. This necessity actually drew the British continually nearer to the snowy Himalayas which stood not only as a great frontier guard on India's northern borders but also as a dividing line between the British empire of India and the Chinese Central Asia. But this great mountain wall in itself was not so vital and important to the security of British India as were the four Himalayan kingdoms-Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet. The British could not afford to neglect these strategically located hill states and more so when they are in a position to provide India "a barrier of unparalleled strength" against foreign Invasion from Central Asia.

While Sikkim, Bhutan and Nepal lay on the Indian side of the Himalaya, Tibet was on the other side. Naturally, British India was not expected to have the same policy towards all the four Himalayan kingdoms which had not only locational differences, but had also no common political heritage and background. The British established the principle of non-recognition of foreign rights over the states lying on Indian side but they allowed Tibet to continue with the fiction of Chinese suzerainty over her. This concession to Peking was not out of any British love for the Manchu rule but for their understanding that Tibet under the suzerainty of weak Chinese would not be a source of danger to the safety and security of British India.

It would not be out of place to discuss the impression of Tibet towards the British in nineteenth century. Lhasa had all along shown hostility towards the British largely due to inherent suspicion of their activities in India. In 1816, the British through the 'Treaty of Sugauli" extended their influence in Nepal and at the same time acquired the Himalayan Districts of Kumaon and Garhwal. The 

group of hill states from Tehri to the boarders of Ladakh also passed into British hands. A few years later, in 1935, the British acquired the picturesque site of Darjeeling from the Raja of Sikkim. In 1946, Lahul and Spiti were detached from Ladakh and brought under British control. Later on, Ladakh, which lay on the west of Tibet, itself came indirectly under British influence. The undivided supremacy of the British in Sikkim to the total exclusion of all other powers including that of Tibet was recognised in 1890. Thus, what had been in the beginning a simple question of opening a trade mart and regularising the Anglo-Tibetan commercial interests turned into a political issue that resulted into demarcation of Sikkim-Tibet frontier as laid down in the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 in which Tibet was not a signatory. Tibetans got alarmed at the rapid extension of British power in and around the Himalayan kingdoms. British rulers in India sensing the reaction of Tibet, deliberately refrained to show political interest in Tibet, more so after forcible expulsion of Tibetans from Sikkim territory. Now, the only alternative before the Indian Government was to go in for commercial contracts with Tibet.

The Anglo-Chinese Convention 1890 had reserved three subjects for future consideration and settlement - the question of Anglo-Tibetan Trade, the problem of communication between the Indian Government and the 'Authorities in Tibeť and lastly, the grazing rights of the Tibetan in Sikkim. Since, the British had accepted Peking's suzerainty over Lhasa, the negotiations for the settlement of the 'Reserved Articles' were resumed afterwards between Government of India and China. Tibet did not participate in it. British India's Tibetan policy under Lansdowne and Elgin from 1890 to 1898 was mainly directed towards establishing trade links with Tibet.

The change in the office of viceroyalty, from Elgin to Curzon, was marked by a distinct approach towards Tibet. While Elgin moved slowly, cautiously and in a conciliatory and compromising spirit in Tibet, Curzon unfolded his Tibetan policy with force and extreme rapidity accepting the suggestions of the frontier officials and the Bengal Government. There are three main reasons behind Curzon's aggressive policy towards Tibet. Firstly, Curzon, a man of high ambition and extra-ordinary energy, had passionate craving to see British Indian Empire 'strengthened and secured from all sides". Curzon regarded India as the strongest pillar of British India in Asia. Secondly, the continued defiance of Peking's authority by the Tibetans and 'the defeat of the Chinese at the hands of Japan in 1895' had exposed the myth of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. Curzon soon realised that the old method of dealing with Tibet through the intermediary China was 'unproductive and 

inglorious". Lastly, the factor which contributed most the shifting of British stand on the Tibetan issue was reported Russian intrigues at Lhasa. In the beginning of the twentieth century, news reached Calcutta that missions were being exchanged between Lhasa and St. Petersburg that a secret deal had been struck between Russia and China whereby Tibet came under the protectorate of Russia. 10

Contrary to Curzon belief that Chinese Amban" as an intermediary is a farce, he first of all sought the help of the Chinese Amban for resolving outstanding disputes between British India and Tibet. This moderate approach was resorted by Curzon to arrive at peaceful and amicable solution taking them in confidence. The failure to receive any positive response from the Chinese Amban confirmed Curzon's earlier conviction that solution of the Tibetan question lay in direct dealings with the Lhasa authorities. In July 1900, Curzon wrote his first letter directly addressed to the God king of Tibet. But Tibetan authorities refused to receive the letter. The Viceroy did not lose hope and turned his eyes to the Bhutan Vakil, Kaji U-gyen who was soon to visit Lhasa to deliver some animals to Dalai Lama's private zoo. He was entrusted with the responsibility to hand over Curzon's letter to the Tibetan Pontiff secretly. This attempt also could not bear fruit. While Curzon was unsuccessfully trying to establish contact with Dalai Lama, emergence of Russia on the Tibetan scene changed the whole course. He knew fully well that even if Tibet was in Russian hands, it would not pose a serious military threat to British India, but it would certainly have most adverse effects on the other Himalayan Kingdoms, i.e., Sikkim, Bhutan and Nepal. He, therefore, thought of adopting a strong and vigorous policy towards Tibet.

Two stages can be noticed in Curzon's Tibetan policy. In the first stage, he attempted to solve the Tibetan problem through diplomacy and by establishing direct contact with the God king of Tibet. When this move failed, Curzon embarked upon a course of military action and violence that marked the second stage Apparently, it would seem that a mission to Lhasa was proposed by the British Indian Government in view of the reported rumour of Russian intervention in Tibet. This was no doubt the immediate pretext but the sense of personal insult which the rejection of Viceroy's letters by Dalai Lama caused in the mind of Curzon also contributed much in shaping his adventurist endeavour.

After several military engagements with the Tibetans, Young husband was appointed to lead the Mission to Tibet and he reached Lhasa in 1904. Dalai Lama fled away at the approach of this British Mission. Young husband, however succeeded in concluding a treaty with Ti-Rimpoche, the Regent, and the members of the Tibetan National Assembly. The British Indian Government achieved all